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INTRODUCTION

Sex sells. This tenet of advertising reflects the power of all things
sex-related in American society. Particularly valued is the right to access sexually explicit material, and discussion of the scope of this right
evokes visceral reactions in both advocates and opponents of pornography. The debate over pornography's position in the marketplace of
ideas becomes even more heated when that marketplace lies within
the confines of the United States penal system.
The question of whether prisoners should retain the right to view
sexually explicit publications implicates First Amendment' freedoms,
rights which are usually among those most fervently cherished by the
American people and most fiercely protected by the courts.2 When
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-

ment for a redress of grievances.").
2
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing conviction for disturbing the peace of defendant who walked through courthouse wearing ajacket that bore
a slogan that included curse words).

1702

20001

PORATOGRAPHY BEUND BARS

1703

those rights belong to prisoners, however, legislatures and judges
seem to place less value on such freedoms. Prisoners "are denied
reading material deemed objectionable by their captors, exposed to
retaliation for expressing opinions at odds with those of their jailers,
refused access to the news media, punished for possessing 'radical'
views, and rewarded for renouncing them."3 Although citizens acknowledge that lawbreaking may result in imprisonment and may
jeopardize the privilege to enjoy certain First Amendment rights, a
government-sponsored retraction of those rights may simply be unconstitutional. 4 Furthermore, the consequences of imprisonment are
of particular significance in the United States, the nation that "leads
the world in per capita incarceration."5 Thus, the debate over which
rights are conditioned upon one's adherence to the law continues. 6
One view within this debate is that criminals are entitled to rights
similar to those that the general population enjoys. 7 The opposing
view is that citizens who break the law are at the mercy of the government, which may revoke any of their privileges. 8 Between these two
extremes, a gray area exists in which the scope of prisoners' rights
remains unclear. The question of access to sexually explicit material
lies within this realm of uncertainty. Like many areas of constitutional
law, regulation of sexually explicit material in prisons is shrouded in a
blur of tests that the Supreme Court employs to explain its holdings. 9
With respect to prohibitions on inmates' access to pornography, however, these tests not only create confusion in the lower courts, but also
effectively trample on prisoners' First Amendment rights in the
process.
This Note surveys the line of cases establishing the framework for
assessing the constitutionality of prison regulations, and advocates a
return to heightened scrutiny analysis of these regulations because the
current standard impinges on prisoners' rights. This Note argues that
under this more stringent review, regulations prohibiting sexually ex3 Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, Silencing the Oppressed: No Freedom of Speech
for Those Behind the Walls, 26 CREIGTrrON L. REv. 1005, 1005 (1993).
4 See infra Part IVA
5 Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 3, at 1005.
6 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996) (discussing prisoner access to
the courts); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (holding that prison inmates do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells that would entite them to
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure).
7 See Banning Porn in Prison, BOSTON HERaLD, Sept. 16, 1998, at 44 ("It appears to
need restating once again that prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights when the
prison doors clang behind them." (quoting Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 204 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Wald,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2392 (1999))).
8 As former Representative John Ensign of Nevada explained, "[c]riminals don't
have the same First Amendment rights that you and I do." Tony Batt, Court Upholds Prison
Pornography Ban, LAs VEGAS R .-J., Sept. 16, 1998, at 4B.
9 See infra Part II.
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plicit material in prisons are unconstitutional. Part I provides a general background of the development of prisoners' rights and depicts
the judicial atmosphere and attitude during the twentieth century.
Part II discusses prisoners' rights in the First Amendment context and
illustrates the Supreme Court's vacillation between a proactive and a
deferential approach to the subject. Part III looks at the narrower
issue of sexually explicit material in prisons by describing the similar
approaches of two courts of appeals; these decisions demonstrate the
trend of deference to prison authorities instituting bans on pornography. Part IV of this Note argues that a ban of this kind is unconstitutional, and it advocates a return to an intermediate scrutiny test for
analyzing prisoners' First Amendment claims. This Part suggests that
under intermediate scrutiny, prisoners will be able to invalidate restrictions on access to sexually explicit material. This Part also argues
that a careful application of the current reasonableness test should
enable prisoners to successfully challenge pornography prohibitions.
Finally, this Note concludes that the courts should establish a pattern
of protecting prisoners' First Amendment rights to ensure that the
United States retains its democratic character.
I
BACKGROUND ON P isoNERs' RIGHTs

To understand prisoners' rights, it is helpful to briefly trace the
origins of the penal system in this country. At the time of the United
States' founding, no organized prison system existed. 10 The institutionalization of prisons did not occur until the 1800s, when there was
"a Jacksonian hope that human improvement was possible if a criminal's unfortunate upbringing could be overcome in an antiseptic and
healthy setting-a hope given urgency by the fear that unless deviant
activity was controlled, the very openness of American society would
cause it to fly apart."" The prevailing view of prisoners' rights at this
time was that they did not have any; a Virginia Court of Appeals judge
epitomized this viewpoint when he wrote that prisoners were "slave [s]
of the state" with the associated dearth of rights.' 2 The court's words
reflect the prevailing opinion at the time that prisoners had given up
their rights as a penalty for their crimes. 13 When this viewpoint became "a bit too raw for mostjudges" during the early to mid-twentieth
century, American courts began to change their ideas about prison1o See Alvin J. Bronstein, Offender Rights Litigation: HistoricalandFuture Developments, in
2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 5, 5 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1980).
11 Id.
12 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 797 (1871).
13
See LYNN S. BRANIm & SHELDON KRANTZ, SENTENCING, CORRECIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL

128 (4th ed. 1994).
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ers' rights. 14 Courts then followed the "hands-off doctrine," which
stood for the proposition that although prisoners may possess rights,
enforcing them was not within the ambit of the courts' jurisdiction.' 5
Courts offered many justifications for this new policy. The first
was a separation of powers argument, which asserted that it was the
responsibility of the legislative and executive branches to enforce prisoners' rights. 16 Under this view, judicial interference would only hamper these efforts. 17 Second, courts argued that because prisons are
generally state-ran, federal court intervention would violate the principle of federalism and might usurp state power.' 8 Third, courts expressed concern "that judicial involvement in the operation of prisons
mightjeopardize institutional security and frustrate the goals of incarceration."' 9 Finally, the judiciary feared that if prisoners were permitted to sue, courts would be inundated with frivolous claims that would
deplete judicial resources. 20 The result of this hands-off doctrine was
"a persistent and virtually uniform refusal to enforce barely any constitutional rights for prisoners," leaving prisoners "to the not-so-tender
'2 1
mercies of their keepers."
The age of civil rights dawned in the 1960s and 1970s, and prisoners were not immune from the fever. 2 2 During this period, courts began to recognize prisoners' constitutional rights; this retreat from the
hands-off doctrine resulted from both societal and judicial changes. 23
In addition to an increasingly militant prison population asserting its
14 Bronstein, supra note 10, at 6; see alsoJack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners'
Rights, FED. PROBATION, March 1995, at 36, 36-38 (providing historical overview of judicial
approaches to prisoners' rights); Hedieh Nasheri, A Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and
Prisoners,27 CUMB. L. Ruv. 1173, 1175-78 (1996-1997) (discussing the "hands-off' approach
in detail).
15 BRANHAm & Ksxrz, supra note 13, at 128.
16 See id. See generally Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L.
REv. 2681, 2682-84 (1996) (discussing different approaches to the separation of powers
doctrine).
17 See id.

18 See BRaNHAui & KRArrz, supra note 13, at 128-29; see also Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d
785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950) (asserting that the federal government is not concerned with
controlling the internal discipline of state prisons).
19 BRANHi & KRarrz, supranote 13, at 129. As Branham and Krantz observe, "[t]he
judges recognized that they lacked correctional expertise, and they were also concerned
that the prospect of liability might sometimes dissuade prison officials from taking the
steps needed to protect institutional security, with resultant harm to people and property
within the prisons." Id. Courts were also concerned with the threat of security breaches
from prisoners travelling from the prison to the courthouse to pursue their suits. See id.
20 See id.
21 Bronstein, supra note 10, at 6; see also Call, supra note 14, at 36 ("Before the 1960's,
courts (including the Supreme Court) did not involve themselves in the issue of prisoners'
rights.").
22 See Bronstein, supra note 10, at 11-12 (noting advances in the area of prisoners'
rights).
23 See BRANHAM & KRAN-rz, supra note 13, at 129-30; Call, supra note 14, at 37-38.
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rights, the legal profession became more responsive to prisoners'
complaints. 24 Contemporaneously, the public began to recognize the
unacceptable conditions common in American prisons. 25 These factors made "it difficult for the courts to adhere to the view that they
could trust the executive and legislative branches of the government
to respect the constitutional rights of prisoners." 26 The outbreak of
prison riots, especially the 1971 riot at Attica State Prison in NewYork,
further goaded the judiciary into taking a more active role in protect27
ing prisoners' rights.
The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape28 significantly
hastened the demise of the hands-off doctrine and "marked a turning
point in modern civil rights litigation." 29 In Monroe, the Supreme
Court permitted an African-American plaintiff complaining of police
misconduct to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.30 The court
clarified the meaning of § 1983's requirement that officials have acted
"under color of' state law, holding that this requirement could be met
if the violation was a "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law ... ."31 The case also "held that the fact that the
officer may have been violating local law did not insulate the defendant from suit under the Civil Rights Act... [and] even if the plaintiff [could sue] under state law, he was not required to exhaust such
remedy before seeking relief under section 1983."32 Thus, Monroe
made it substantially easier for prisoners to bring claims under § 1983.
24
25

See BRANHAme
& Ki
See id.

26

d.

27
28

See id.

, supra note 13, at 130.

365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
29 Howard B. Eisenberg, RethinkingPrisonerCivil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counse 17 S. ILL. U. LJ. 417, 423 (1993).
30 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997).
31 Monroe 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
52 Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 423.
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Another case that scholars characterize as a "turning point in
constitutional analysis" 33 is Cooper v. Pate.34 Commentators view this
decision as "effectively initiat[ing] the demise of the hands-off doctrine."3 5 In Cooper, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that
inmates retain various rights and privileges bestowed by the Constitution, despite their imprisonment.3 6 Additionally, the Court recognized that prisoners may seek redress through the court system for an
infringement of their rights. 3 7 After the Cooper decision, the Court
confronted the scope of prisoners' rights in many areas.38
Despite these advances, remnants of the hands-off doctrine litter
the area of prisoner litigation. 39 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
asserted that deference is owed to prison officials, resulting in frequent curtailment of prisoners' rights. 40 A prime example of this result-and the central focus of this Note-is censorship of inmate mail.
II
BAC KGROUND ON PRisoNERs' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Regulation of prisoners' mail implicates the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. 41 The evolution of prisoners' First Amendment rights has followed a path similar to that of prisoners' rights in
general, and the judiciary's approach has likewise mutated from a
hands-off stance to an active one. 42 Regulation of prisoners' mall has
been a contested issue since courts began hearing these claims. 43 Unfortunately, most of the history in this area is plagued with uncertainty
and inconsistency." This uncertainty is due to the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to articulate a clear standard of review for these complaints, as well as the lower courts' confused application of those stan45
dards the Court did suggest.
33
Barbara Belbot, Where Can a PrisonerFind a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of
ImprisonmentEscalate 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rxv. 1, 1 (1998).
34
378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
35
Matthew P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners'Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 Am.U. L. REv. 453, 460 (1988); see also Call, supra note 14, at 37
(discussing Cooperas an example of the Supreme Court "jump[ing] on the prisoners' rights
bandwagon").
36
See Coaper, 378 U.S. at 546 (holding unanimously that prisoner had a § 1983 cause
of action for violation of his freedom of religion).

37

Seei

SeeBelbot, supra note 33, at 1. The Court addressed prisoners' rights in the context
of "access to the courts, medical care, and censorship of mail." I& (footnotes omitted).
38
39

40
41

42
43
44
45

See BRANHAi & KRANrz, supra note 13, at 132.
See id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

See supra Part I.
See JoHN W. PALMER, CoNsOrrtTioNAL
See id. at 41-50.
See infra Parts 11A-C, HIA-B, IV.B.1.

RIGHTS OF PIUSONERs

40 (5th ed. 1997).
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The traditional view regarding mail regulation is that "control of
inmate mail is an administrative matter in which the courts will not
interfere, unless it is shown that some independent constitutional
right is being infringed."46 Under this conception of prisoners' rights,
47
an inmate unable to implicate an independent constitutional right
would likely face an unsuccessful claim. 48 Historically, prison restrictions on incoming mail were justified on the grounds that they would
prevent contraband from slipping into prisons, and would enable
prison officials to ferret out escape plans. 49 Courts generally found
this rationale sufficient to uphold these restrictions. 50 However, when
prison administrators refused to mall prisoner correspondence that
neither contained "contraband [n]or details of illegal schemes,"
courts grew critical. 51 While courts criticized restrictions on these
other materials, they considered the policies themselves acceptable
under the traditional view. 52 In contrast, the new approach to censor53
ship cases requires officials to justify their restrictions.
A.

Procunierv. Martinez

The rationale for requiring this justification is exemplified by
Procunier v. Martinez,54 in which the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a prison mail censorship regulation. 5 5 Prior to this
decision, lower courts had no clear standards to apply when analyzing
the constitutionality of prison regulations. 56 Thus, it was imperative
for the Supreme Court to articulate a standard of review to ensure
consistency and even-handed oversight across the country. Prior to
Martinez, the Supreme Court had never specifically articulated "the
46
47

supranote 43, at 41.
Examples of these constitutional rights include the following:
[G]ommunication between an inmate and a court involved the right of access to the court system. Communication between an inmate and his attorney involved both the right of access to courts and the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel for criminals. The First Amendment right to petition
government for redress of grievances justified court intervention in correspondence to and from nonjudicial public officials and agencies. The cherished American freedoms of speech and press were involved in regulations
concerning access to news media. These rights also were involved in attempts by prison officials to exclude newspapers, magazines, and books
from an institution.
PALMER,

id
48

49
50

See id.
See id. at 42.
See id.

51

i

52

See id.

53
54
55
56

See id
416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled in partby Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
See ia at 398-400.
See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
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appropriate standard of review for prison regulations restricting freedom of speech." 57 The tension between the historical judicial deference to prison authority and the emerging concern about prisoners'
constitutional rights led to a muddled group of conflicting opinions
between circuits. 58 Hence, the Martinez Court undertook to resolve
this confusion by establishing a standard of review for analyzing in59
mate mall regulations.
Although the Court declined to rule on the extent of prisoners'
constitutional rights in this context, the Court did establish a uniform
test for determining the constitutionality of mail censorship regulations. This test
h[e]ld that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the following
criteria are met. First, the regulation or practice in question must
further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor
inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they
must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers
one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security,
order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to
the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.
Thus a restriction on inmate correspondence that furthers an important or substantial interest of penal administration will neverthe60
less be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.
57
58

Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406.
See id.As the Martinez Court noted,

Some [courts] have maintained a hands-off posture in the face of constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail. Another has required
only that censorship of personal correspondence not lack support "inany
rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system." At the
other extreme some courts have been willing to require demonstration of a
"compelling state interest" to justify censorship of prisoner mail. Other
courts phrase the standard in similarly demanding terms of "clear and present danger." And there are various intermediate positions, most notably
the view that a "regulation or practice which restricts the right of free expression that a prisoner would have enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned
must be related both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of
some justifiable purpose."
Id at 406-07 (citations omitted).
59 See id. at 407-14.
60 Id at 413-14. The Court added:
This does not mean.., that prison administrators may be required to show
with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the failure to
censor a particular letter. Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to
the proper discharge of an administrator's duty.
Id. at 414.
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This test is important for several reasons. First, as discussed
above, it is the first clear enunciation of a standard for reviewing prisoners' First Amendment claims. 61 Significantly, however, the Court
viewed the First Amendment "in terms of the rights of society, rather
than [solely] those of the prisoner,"62 and thus "stopped short of articulating a broad standard of review for restrictions on prisoners' first
amendment rights." 63 Second, some courts and commentators have
classified this standard as one requiring intermediate scrutiny6 of the
challenged regulation, 65 while others have described it as a "least re61 SeeJennifer A. Mannetta, Note, The ProperApproach to Prison Mail Regulations: Standards of Review, 24 NEW ENG.J. ON GluM. & CrV. CONFNEMENT 209, 213 (1998) (noting that
Martinez pronounced the first "standard of review regarding prison regulations on First
Amendment rights"); supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
62 Mannetta, supra note 61, at 214.
63 Blischak, supra note 35, at 461-62 (emphasis added); see also Emily Calhoun, The
FirstAmendment Rights ofPrisoners,in 2 PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 43,
45 ("[The Martinez test] was used to secure vicarious relief for prisoners from the impact of
prison regulations only because the regulations also implicated the first amendment rights
of free persons."); Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, UntanglingFirst Amendment Values: The Prisoners'Diemma, 59 GFo. WASH. L. Rxv. 1614, 1627-28 (1991) ("Martinez... expressly left open
the question of what protection would be accorded to inmate speech that did not also
implicate the free speech rights of free persons.").
64 Standards of review commonly appear in equal protection decisions. SeeJOHN E.
NoWAK & RONALT D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTuTiONAL LAw § 14.3, at 601 (5th ed. 1995). In

those cases, the level of scrutiny the Court applies depends on the type of classification
made by the government. See i. The Court traditionally uses two standards, the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. See id. Under the rational relationship test,
"the Court will ask only whether it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational
relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the Constitution." Id
Rational basis review "gives a strong presumption of constitutionality to the governmental
action," and "the Court only invalidates the law if it has no rational relationship to any
legitimate interest of government." Id. at 605. Fundamentally, "[t]he rational basis test is
notoriously weak." Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating Unwittingly or Otherwis4 64 TEMp. L. REv. 937, 941 (1991). In contrast, under the strict
scrutiny test, "the Justices will not defer to the decision of the other branches of government but will instead independently determine the degree of relationship which the classification bears to a constitutionally compelling end." NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 14.3, at
601-02. Strict scrutiny is most often characterized as "requir[ing] a classification to be
necessary (narrowly tailored) to a compelling or overriding government interest." Id at
606. This test is generally applied when legislation restricts a fundamental right or when a
law makes a suspect classification. See id, at 602.
Until the 1960s, the Supreme Court primarily used either the rational basis or strict
scrutiny standard to review legislation. See id. at 602-03. More recently, however, the Court
has utilized a standard that falls somewhere between the traditional two categories. See id.
at 603. This "intermediate standard of review.., is not as difficult for the government to
meet as the compelling interest test, but.., involves far less deference to the legislature
than does the rationality test." Id. Using the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Court
"will not uphold a classification unless they find that the dassification has a 'substantial
relationship' to an 'important' government interest." Id The Court has invoked this test
in cases dealing with laws making classifications on the basis of gender or illegitimacy. See
id,

65

See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 63, at 55 n.23 ("[T]he [Martinez] test is certainly more

stringent than a mere rationality standard."); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases,
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strictive means test. '66 The Martinez standard's status as one requiring
at least some level of heightened scrutiny returned to haunt the Court
in later cases, forcing the Justices to clarify exactly what that standard
entailed. 67 Finally, the Court declared the importance of "the government interests which were at stake in the case: the preservation of
internal order and discipline in the prison; the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry; and the rehabilitation of prisoners." 68 These interests would prove useful as
defenses to future challenges to prison regulations. 6 9 Because the
Court was "unwilling to define precisely the scope of prisoners' first
amendment rights," 70 this issue came before the Supreme Court again
in the seminal case of this area of law.
B.

Turner v. Safley

Turner v. Saj7ly 71 is the landmark case in the struggle to define
prisoners' First Amendment rights and is perhaps most significant because of the degree to which lower courts rely on its four-factor test to

determine the legality of challenged prison regulations.7 2 Two regulations were at issue in this case: "[t]he first.., relates to correspondence between inmates at different institutions.17 3 The second
103 HARv. L. REv. 137, 241 (1989) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (referring to the "Martinez
intermediate scrutiny test").
66 Frankel, supranote 63, at 1625; see also SamuelJ. Levine, Note, Restrictingthe Right of
Correspondence in the Prison Context: Thornburgh v. Abbott and Its Progeny, 4 FoRDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ETrr. Lj. 891, 896 (1994) ("[T]he Martinez Court posited an intermediate scrutiny standard."); Mannetta, supra note 61, at 237 ("[T]he Court in Martinez
utilized a 'least restrictive means test' in the prison context."). But see Kuby & Kunstler,
supra note 3, at 1007 (contending that "[t]he idea that this created a 'least restrictive
means test' ... that would apply to anyone else's rights was scotched" and citing for support the Supreme Court's statement that "[tihis does not mean ...that prison administrators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the
failure to censor a particular letter" (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414
(1974), overruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989))).
67 See infra Part II.B-C.
68 Blischak, supra note 35, at 461.
69 See, e.g., Oteyv. Best, 680 F.2d 1231, 1233 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[W]e believe that, especially when maintenance of institutional security is at issue, prison officials ordinarily must
have wide latitude within which to make appropriate limitations."); Rogers v. Scurr, 676
F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1982) (same).
70 Calhoun, supra note 63, at 46; see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text
(discussing limitations on the Martinez holding).
71 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
72 See, e.g., Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 615, 618, 620-21 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69, 73-76 (2d Cir. 1989); Lane v. Griffin, 834 F.2d 403, 406-07
(4th Cir. 1987); Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
331-44 (3d Cir. 1987); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987); Allen v.
Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1987); Rodriguez v. James, 823 F.2d 8, 11-12 (2d
Cir. 1987).
73 Turner,482 U.S. at 81. The Court explained that the regulation "permits... correspondence 'with immediate family members who are inmates in other correctional institu-
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regulation allowed prisoners to many "only with the permission of the
superintendent of the prison, and provides that such approval should
be given only 'when there are compelling reasons to do so.' 74
In reaching its decision, the Court in Turner first briefly surveyed
several prisoners' rights cases decided during the years between Martinez and Turner.75 The Court noted that the prison regulations in these
cases did not trigger "a standard of heightened scrutiny, but instead
[the Court] inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an 'exaggerated response' to those
concerns. ' 76 The Supreme Court criticized the district court and the
court of appeals for applying the "strict scrutiny standard" 77 from
Procunierv. Martinez,78 and for narrowly construing the cases that followed Martinez, thus rendering their rationales inapplicable to
79
Turner.
The Court then boldly asserted the crux of its opinion:
tions,' and it permits correspondence between inmates 'concerning legal matters.'" Id
Other inmate-to-inmate correspondence "is permitted only if 'the classification/treatment
team of each inmate deems it in the best interest of the parties involved.'" Id at 81-82.
74
Id. at 82.
75 See id&
at 86-87. The Court summarized four cases before beginning its analysis. It
began with Pell v. Procunier,417 U.S. 817 (1974), in which prisoners challenged a regulation forbidding face-to-face media interviews with inmates. See id at 819-21. The Court
upheld the prohibition, and explained that issues "regarding prison security 'are peculiarly
within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence
of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their
response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment
in such matters.'" Turner,482 U.S. at 86 (quoting Pelg 417 U.S. at 827). The second case
the TurnerCourt discussed was Jones v. North CarolinaPrisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977),
in which the Court upheld regulations that attempted to hinder inmate involvement in
prisoner labor unions. See id.
at 121. The Jones Court, showing deference to prison officials, held that the regulations were "rationally related to the reasonable.., objectives of
prison administration." Id at 129. The third case the Turneropinion highlighted was Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in which the Court considered a regulation prohibiting
inmates from receiving hardbound books mailed from anywhere other than a bookstore, a
book publisher, or a book club. See it.
at 548-49. The Court upheld the rule, asserting that
the restriction was a "rational response ... to an obvious security problem," and was not an
exaggerated response. Id at 550-52. Finally, the Court mentioned Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576 (1984), which upheld a prohibition on contact visits because it was "reasonably
related" to security concerns voiced by prison officials. Id.at 586, 589.
76
Turner,482 U.S. at 87.
77 Id at 83.
78 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled inpartby Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989);
see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny standard).
79
See Turner,482 U.S. at 87-88; see also Blischak, supranote 35, at 465 ("The Supreme
Court in Turner expressly rejected a strict scrutiny analysis in favor of a reasonableness
standard for adjudicating challenges to regulations curtailing prisoners' constitutional
rights."). The Turner Court also "distinguished Martinezon the ground that it had involved
a prison regulation-prohibiting inmate correspondence-that burdened the First
Amendment rights of both prisoners and free persons." Frankel, supra note 63, at 1626.
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If Pel Jones, and Bell have not already resolved the question posed in
Martinez, we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In our view, such a
standard is necessary if "prison administrators .... and not the
courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison
officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.
The rule would also distort the decisionmaking process ....Courts
inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes
the best solution to every administrative problem, thereby "unnecesof the federal courts in affairs
sarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement
80
of prison administration."
The Court proceeded to lay out several factors to consider when assessing the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. The
first factor is whether there is a "'valid, rational connection' between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it."81 The Court stressed that the "governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one. '8 2

Second, a court

should examine "whether there are alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to prison inmates. '8 3 Third, a court
should consider "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally. '8 4 The Court's fourth and final
point was that "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation."8 5
80
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citations omitted). As Frankel notes, this "test arose from
...Martine, which expressly left open the question of what protection would be accorded
to inmate speech that did not also implicate the free speech rights of free persons." Frankel, supra note 63, at 1627-28. The Turner test "resolved that question." Id. at 1628.
81 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
82
83

Id. at 90.

Id. The court noted that "[w] here 'other avenues' remain available for the exercise
of the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the 'measure of judicial
deference owed to corrections officials... in gauging the validity of the regulation.'" Id.
(citations omitted).
84
Id. The Court noted that almost without fail, changes in a prison environment will
affect both the freedom of other prisoners, as well as the prison's allocation of its resources. See id. The Court also asserted that "[wi]hen accommodation of an asserted right
will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials." Id.
85
i Under this factor, the Court seeks to prevent an "exaggerated response" from
prison officials and points out that this is not a "least restrictive alternative" test. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court does note that "ifan inmate claimant
can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost
to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation
does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Id. at 91.
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The Turner court then applied this framework to the facts of the
case and held that the regulation prohibiting correspondence between inmates was "reasonably related to legitimate security interests."'8 6 However, the marriage regulation did not meet the test
because it "constitute[d] an exaggerated response to petitioners' rehabilitation and security concerns."8 7 Thus, while the treatment of
these regulations is important, it is more significant that the Turner
Court finally addressed the issue it had evaded for so long-the scope
of prisoners' First Amendment rights. a8 In comparison to the pre-Turner era, "it will now be an uphill battle for an inmate to prevail on a
constitutional claim to which the Turner test is applied."89 However,
the task is not impossible, as the Court's decision to strike the marriage regulation in Turner illustrates. 90 Despite Turners explicit test,
the Court did reexamine the issue of prisoners' First Amendment
rights a mere two years later. Nevertheless, the Turner standard's legacy remains potent today, particularly in the arena of a prisoner's
right to access sexually explicit material. 91
C.

Thornburgh v. Abbott
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Thornburghv. Abbott,92 a case

which culminated "[t]he progression of Supreme Court cases in
which inmates' free speech rights were narrowly construed." 93 The
Court in Abbott reviewed Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations that
governed the censorship of publications sent to inmates. 94 Under
86
M; see also PALMER, supra note 43, at 43 (noting that "[the regulations were logically related to the legitimate security concerns of prison officials" and that they "did not
deprive prisoners of all means of expression, but simply barred communication with a
limited class of people... with whom authorities have particular cause to be concerned").
87 Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
88 Additionally, Turner is significant because "the Court construed some of these factors so as to almost foreordain a finding in favor of the constitutionality of most prison
regulations and practices." BRANHAM & KRA~rz, supra note 13, at 145.
89
Id-at 147.
90 See i& at 147-49.
91 See infra Part III.
92 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
93
BRANHAM & KRA=, supra note 13, at 149.
94 See Abbot 490 U.S. at 403. The Court explained that it was "concerned primarily
with the regulations set forth at 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.70 and 540.71 (1988), first promulgated
in 1979." Ia at 404. The opinion reprints several key passages as follows:
Publications which may be rejected by a Warden include but are not limited
to publications which meet one of the following criteria:
(1) It depicts or describes procedures for the construction or use of weapons, ammunition, bombs or incendiary devices;
(2) It depicts, encourages, or describes methods of escape from correctional facilities, or contains blueprints, drawings or similar descriptions of
Bureau of Prisons institutions;
(3) It depicts or describes procedures for the brewing of alcoholic beverages, or the manufacture of drugs;
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these regulations, an inmate generally can receive publications while
incarcerated, 95 but the warden may reject material according to specific criteria. 96 Significantly, the warden has the power to reject a publication deemed "detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline
of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity. '9 7 However,
" [t]he regulations provide procedural safeguards for both the recipi98
ent and the sender."
The Abbott majority conceded that the aforementioned regulations, if applied to free citizens, would implicate serious First Amendment concerns. 99 Nevertheless, the Court applied the Turner
reasonableness test to these regulations instead of the less deferential
Martinez standard. 10 0 The Court cited several reasons for applying this
standard, 10 1 including the Court's fear that lower courts might misinterpret the Martinez test as requiring a heightened degree of scrutiny. 10 2 Applying Turneis four-factor test, the Court determined that
the regulations were facially valid. 10 3 The Court held that incoming
and outgoing prisoner mail would be analyzed under separate stan(4) It is written in code;

(5) It depicts, describes or encourages activities which may lead to the use
of physical violence or group disruption;
(6) It encourages or instructs in the commission of criminal activity;
(7) It is sexually explicit material which by its nature or content poses a
threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution, or facilitates criminal activity.
Id. at 405 n.5 (quoting 28 C.F.R § 540.71(b) (1988)).
95 See 28 C.F.R § 540.71(a) (1999).
96
See id. § 540.71 (b) (1)-(7).
97 Id. § 540.71(b).
98 Abbot 490 U.S. at 406. These procedures include instructions that "[t]he warden
may designate staff to screen and, where appropriate, to approve incoming publications,
but only the warden may reject a publication," as well as directions for appealing these
decisions. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b)).
99 See id. at 407.
100 See it. at 413-14.
11 See id. at 409-12.
102 See ide at 409-10. The Court explained its prior decisions:
The Court's decision to apply a reasonableness standard... rather than
Martinez' less deferential approach stemmed from its concern that language
in Martinez might be too readily understood as establishing a standard of
"strict" or "heightened" scrutiny, and that such a strict standard simply was
not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are centrally concerned with the maintenance of order and security within prisons.
Id.; see also Leading Cases, supra note 65, at 242 (explaining that "the Court had shifted to
the reasonableness standard because of lower court misinterpretation of Martinez as requiring 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny"); Mannetta, supranote 61, at 217-18 ("The Court decided to adopt the reasonableness standard in Turner because the Court feared that the
Martinez standard... would be misconstrued as a strict scrutiny standard.").
103 See Abbot 490 U.S. at 419. The Court remanded the case to the lower courts for
consideration of whether the regulations were valid as applied to 46 specific publications
that were named in the parties' briefs. See it.
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dards, thus overruling part of Martinez 10 4 Martinez now applies only to
outgoing personal correspondence from prisoners, while a reasonableness standard governs incoming mail. 10 5 Branham and Krantz
note that "[a]lthough the only issue actually before the Court was the
standard to be applied to incoming publications and not the standard
to be applied to incoming personal correspondence, the Court sweepingly announced that application, of the [Martinez] test was to be con10 6
fined to outgoing correspondence."
Commentators have criticized Abbott on the grounds that it perpetuates "the Court's evisceration of first amendment rights in the
prison context and its expansion of the discretion afforded to prison
administrators."10 7 Further, "[i] ts limitation of Martinez' scope to situations involving outgoing correspondence effectively eliminates judicial protection of the first amendment rights of nonprisoners who
seek to communicate with inmates."10 8 Additionally, the Court based
its application of a more deferential standard to incoming as opposed
to outgoing mail on the premise that incoming mail poses a greater
hazard to the state interest in prison security. 10 9 However, this argument focused on the dangers presented by incoming publications and
did not distinguish between such publications and incoming personal
correspondence. 110 Consequently, "the Court allowed for the application of a broad reasonableness standard for all mail sent into prisons,
regardless of its nature.""'
Scholars have also criticized the manner in which the Abbott majority characterized Martinez and Turner, as well as the distinction the
104

105

See id. at 413-14.
See id. The Court clarified this distinction:
[T]he logic of our analyses in Martinezand Turnerrequires that Martinezbe
limited to regulations concerning outgoing correspondence. As we have
observed, outgoing correspondence was the central focus of our opinion in
Martinez. The implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security
are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming
materials. Any attempt to justify a similar categorical distinction between
incoming correspondence from prisoners (to which we applied a reasonableness standard in Turner) and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners would likely prove futile, and we do not invite it. To the extent
that Martinez itself suggests such a distinction, we today overrule that case;
the Court accomplished much of this step when it decided Turner.

id.
106 BRANHAM & KRAN-rz, supra note 13, at 149-50.
107 Leading Cases, supra note 65, at 244.
108 Id. at 244-45.
109 The Court explained "that outgoing correspondence that magnifies grievances or
contains inflammatory racial views cannot reasonably be expected to present a danger to
the community inside the prison." Abbott, 490 U.S. at 411-12. The Court added that "the
implications for security are far more predictable." Id. at 412.
110 See id. at 413-14.
111

Levine, supra note 66, at 909.
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Court posited between the two cases. 1 2 The inmate correspondence
regulation that the Turner Court reviewed under a reasonableness
standard only implicated the rights of prisoners; it did not affect nonprisoners."13 In contrast, the regulations in Abbott clearly implicated
the rights of nonprisoners, specifically those of the publishers who desired communication with inmates. 1 4 Hence, Abbott is more closely
analogous to Martinez, in which nonprisoner rights were likewise compromised." 5 Arguably, the Martinez decision dictates the application
of an intermediate scrutiny standard, not Turnds mere reasonableness test." 6 Finally, the Abbott Court "incorrectly asserted that Turner
and its precursors dictated the application of a reasonableness standard" because "[t]hose cases either implicitly affirmed the continuing
vitality of Martinez or did not undermine it."' n1

Turneritself "implicitly

affirmed both the Martinez standard of scrutiny and its greater protection of noninmate rights."" 8 Thus, Abbott signalled a retreat in the
area of prisoners' rights, moving back towards the hands-off approach
of the early twentieth century. 1 9 The evolution from Martinez to Abbott demonstrates how the Court shifted from protecting prisoners'
120
rights to restricting them.
112
113

See id. at 910-13.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1987); see also supra note 73 and accompa-

nying text (discussing the limited scope of the regulations involved in Turner).
114 See Abbott, 490 U.S. at 408 (stating that "there is no question that publishers who
wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of
view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners").
115 See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see alsoBRANHAM & KR , supra note 13,
at 149 ("Like the censorship regulations that were at issue in Procunierv. Martinez, the[ ]
[Abbott] regulations had an impact on the free speech interests of nonprisoners as well as
prisoners."); Levine, supra note 66, at 911-12 ("The regulations in Abbott as those in Martinez, implicated the First Amendment rights of nonprisoners; the regulations in [Turner]
did not.").
116 See supranotes 64-66 and accompanying text.
117 Leading Cases, supra note 65, at 245. Notably, the Court in Turner"declared Martinez inapplicable to a regulation restricting inmate-to-inmate correspondence because Martine turned on the consequential restriction of an outsider's first amendment interest in
uncensored correspondence with an inmate," and "explicitly recognized that the Martinez
standard might apply to a regulation restricting inmate marriages because of the restriction's impact on nonprisoners." Id.at 246.
118

Id. at 246.

119 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
120 Incidentally, some commentators have leveled scathing criticisms against the line
of prisoners' rights cases described above, asserting that:
These cases established the framework for the free speech rights of the millions of Americans to pass through the American penal system in the 1980s
and early 1990s-the decade that would see the greatest growth in prison
population in history. The lower federal courts, packed with Reagan-Bush
clones and aided by a Justice Department eager to have as many people
enjoy as few civil liberties as possible, were free to savage the free speech
right of prisoners. Indeed, entrusting trained chimps to paste up cliches
from Pell Martinez, Jones, and Wolfish above the word "denied" would
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III
PRISONS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND SEXUALLY
ExPucrr MATERIAL

The preceding Parts describe the key cases in the area of prisoners' rights litigation. However, uncertainty still exists with respect to
the standards courts should apply to evaluate prison regulations and
the strictness of those standards. A sub-issue in this context is whether
to allow sexually explicit material inside prison walls, a debate that
implicates First Amendment considerations and evokes strong emotional reactions on both sides of the argument. This Note argues that
the government should not withhold sexually explicit material from
prisoners, a result that courts could possibly achieve through application of Turneis reasonableness standard or, more likely, by reversion
to a heightened scrutiny analysis. Two recent court of appeals cases
discussing this issue are particularly instructive.
A. Amatel v. Reno
In Amatel v. Ren,121 "[a] group of prisoners and publishers challenge [d] the constitutionality of a statutory ban on the use of Bureau
of Prisons funds to distribute sexually explicit material to prisoners."' 2 2 In 1997, three prisoners filed suit and asserted that the Ensign
Amendment 12 3 violated their First Amendment rights. 124 The Ensign
Amendment, passed in 1996, "bars the use of Bureau of Prisons funds
to pay for the distribution of commercial material that 'is sexually explicit or features nudity.""' 125 The court explained that although this
statute does not explicitly prevent prisoners from acquiring the proscribed material "at their own expense," this is not a legitimate possiachieve roughly the same result as seeking redress from the federal
judiciary.
Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 3, at 1010 (footnote omitted).
121 156 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. C. 2392 (1999).
122 Id. at 194.
123 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 614, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-66 (1996).
124 See Amate4 156 F.3d at 195.
125 Id. at 194 (citing § 614, 110 Stat. at 3009-66). The Bureau narrowed the scope of
this statute by issuing regulations that clarify its terms. See id. The court explained how the
regulations define the following terms:
"[N]udity" means "a pictorial depiction where genitalia or female breasts
are exposed"; "features" means that "the publication contains depictions of
nudity or sexually explicit conduct on a routine or regular basis or promotes itself based upon such depictions in the case of individual one-time
issues." Even material that otherwise would be said to "feature nudity" is
excepted if it contains "nudity illustrative of medical, educational, or anthropological content." "Sexually explicit" means "a pictorial depiction of
actual or simulated sexual acts including sexual intercourse, oral sex, or
masturbation."
Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.72(b) (1998)).
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bility.126 Thus, the court's analysis equates the Bureau's funding
1 27
limitation with a ban on distribution.
The prisoners sought relief from the Ensign Amendment and its
implementing legislation, alleging that both violated their First
Amendment rights. 128 The court consolidated these suits and joined
them with similar suits filed by the publishers of the magazines to
which the prisoners were denied access. 129 The district court had earlier found the Amendment facially invalid and enjoined its
enforcement. 1 0
As the majority noted, all parties to the litigation agreed that the
Turner test applied.'l ' Significantly, the D.C. Circuit noted that prison
regulations may be "more intrusive than what may lawfully apply to
the general public." 8 2 The court then discussed the four factors of
the Turner "reasonable relation" test.' 33 In Amate, the stated purpose
of the government's regulation was "the rehabilitation of prisonId. at 194 n.1.
See id. The court notes that "[w]here the government absolutely monopolizes the
means of speech or controls a bottleneck, as we are assuming vis-a-vis the prison distribution system, a refusal to fund functions the same as an outright ban." Id128
See id. at 195. The majority opinion took issue with the district court "as to the
proper object ofjudicial scrutiny" with respect to this two-pronged claim for relief. Id The
D.C. Circuit criticized the district court for focusing on the statute and assuming "that the
statute itself has been and will be applied to these plaintiffs...." Id The D.C. Circuit then
stated that there was no indication that "any warden does or will apply the statute directly;
so far as appears, all enforcement is mediated through the [implementing] regulations."
Id. The court then attempted to distinguish their argument from that of the dissent, noting that
[i]nsofar as plaintiffs attack the proscriptions of the statute not embodied
in the regulations, they effectively pursue a pre-enforcement challenge.
Even in the First Amendment context, such a challenge presents ajusticiable controversy only if the probability of enforcement is "real and substantial." In the statutory borderland beyond the implementing regulations
(i.e., the statute's apparent ban on some non-pictorial material, its vaguer
language, and its lack of any exception for medical or educational material), the prospect of enforcement appears completely insubstantial. It is as
if the government had waived certain provisions of the law. And with such
a waiver, as Salvation Army explicitly holds, there is no standing to challenge
the waived provisions. We therefore limit our focus to the substantive
prohibitions of the regulations.
Id (citations omitted).
129
See id.
180
See id.
126
127

131

SeeMid.

Id at 196. The court explained that in these situations, "the government is permitted to balance constitutional rights against institutional efficiency in ways it may not ordinarily do." Id.
188
See supranotes 81-85 and accompanying text. The court asserted that the first factor, "whether the restriction bears a 'valid, rational connection' to the 'legitimate governmental interest put forward tojustify it,' such that the 'asserted goal is [not] so remote as
to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. . . "is particularly important. Amate, 156 F.3d
at 196.
132
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ers."'134 The court's next step was to determine if this goal was "legiti1 35
mate" and "neutral" according to the Turner standard.
The majority flatly deemed the goal of rehabilitation a legitimate
one, noting that "the Supreme Court has often characterized rehabilitation as one of the primary goals of penal institutions."'1 6 The first
Turner factor also involves assessing the neutrality of the goal. 3 7 The
court distinguished neutrality in a Turner sense from neutrality as the
district court interpreted the word, explaining that "the regulation or
practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression."' 3 8 The
regulation passed the neutrality test, because the majority believed
that the Supreme Court did not intend for the test to require neutral9
ity in the true First Amendment sense13
The court next made a bold statement regarding the power of
the government to essentially censor ideas or "inculcate values" in any
context. 140 The court admitted that this power conflicts with the
thrust of the First Amendment, but claimed that it is permissible for a
state "to become a player in the marketplace of ideas." 141 In government-sponsored institutions, the court added, this power is even
greater. 14 2 The court then drew an analogy to Board of Education, Island Trees UnionFree School DistrictNo. 26 v. Pico,143 claiming that if the
Supreme Court has allowed the promotion of values in schools, it is
likewise an allowable government interest in prisons.144 Thus, the ma134

Id.

135
136

1&

141
142

1&
See i&t at 198. The court does concede, however, that the government does not

I- The court cited the historical penological goals of New York and Pennsylvania
as evidence of this legitimacy. Their objective was to create a prison "free of corruptions
and dedicated to the proper training of the inmate, [that] would inculcate the discipline
that negligent parents, evil companions, taverns, houses of prostitution, theaters, and gambling halls had destroyed. Just as the criminal's environment had led him into crime, the
institutional environment would lead him out.. . ." Id. at 197 (quoting DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN,
THE DIscoVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEw REPUBLIc 82-83
(1990)).
137 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
138
Amate4 156 F.3d at 197 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,415 (1989)).
The Court attempted to distinguish this definition of neutrality from First Amendment
content-neutrality. See id.
139 See id. The court asserted that the proper method for analyzing neutrality is to
examine the manner in which the Supreme Court has actually applied this test. See id. The
majority explained that they "think the Court's actual application of the requirement, with
its focus on the existence of some legitimate goal and on assuring that rules are in fact not
framed so as to advance illegitimate or unvetted goals, must control our [, the majority's,]
understanding of its meaning." Id.
140 Id.

have the ability to advocate any concept it chooses. See id.
143 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
144 See Amatel 156 F.3d at 198.
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jority "conclude[d] that rehabilitation, and such character-moulding
as may be implicit therein, constitute legitimate and neutral goals as
those are understood in [Turner].'

45

The court next inquired whether a rational connection existed
between the prison regulation and the acknowledged governmental
interest.' 46 While admitting that prison law "is not well enough developed to indicate precisely how demanding the requirement of rational means-end connection is,"' 47 the court decided that the Turner
test is sufficiently similar to standard rational relation review to warrant its treatment as such. 148 In this case, the court reasoned, the legislature drafted the regulation and previously determined that
14 9
pornography in prisons hampers the stated goal of rehabilitation.
Thus, the court merely had to decide whether this determination was
rational. 50 The court concluded that the government might "rationally have seen a connection between pornography and rehabilitative
values."' 5 1 The panel concluded its rationality inquiry by conceding
the lack of a conclusive causal link because studies exist offering conflicting conclusions, but reiterated that analyzing this data is not the
court's task. 152 The court declared that "[w]hen Congress undertakes
to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious
not to rewrite legislation, even assuming, arguendo, that judges with
more direct exposure to the problem might make wiser choices."' 53
Clearly, the existence of conflicting authority on the issue guided the
court's finding of reasonableness.15 4 The court explained that "[flor
judges seeking only a reasonable connection between legislative goals
55
and actions, scientific indeterminacy is determinative."'
145
146
147
148

Id.
See id. at 198-201.
IE at 198.
See id at 198-99; see also supra note 64 (discussing constitutional standards of

review).
See Amatel 156 F.3d at 199.
See id. The court recognized the distinction between this type of review and the
question of whether they agree with the legislature, which must not be the crux of rationality review. "[t]he question for us [the court] is not whether the regulation in fact advances
the government interest, only whether the legislature might reasonably have thought that
it would." Id151
Id. The court admitted, however, that no scientific data was presented to support
this view, and claimed that common sense may also be instructive in determining rationality. See id The opinion also discussed studies that claim to establish or refute a connection
between pornography and sexual offenses, which Congress did not cite. See id- at 199 & n.6.
152
See id. at 200.
'53
Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).
154
See id. at 200-01.
155 Id. at 201.
149

150
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Next, the court addressed the remaining factors of the Turner
analysis. 15 6 The majority summarily dismissed the second factor,
which requires an examination of "the prisoners' alternative means of
exercising the right at stake."1 5 7 The court examined the regulation
in a broad sense and decided that "unless there is some minimum
entitlement to smut in prison, the origins of which must be obscure,
this factor can hardly be fatal." 158 The third Turner factor deals with
the potential negative impact that accommodation of the claimed
right might have on other members of the prison community and allocation of resources therein.' 59 The majority analogized this factor
to the first prong's balancing test, stating that if the legislature determined that the presence of pornography in prisons would increase
the risk of danger to both guards and inmates, the adverse impact
160
would be substantial.
Asserting a connection between the third and fourth factors, the
court next launched into an analysis of the final Turner factor:
"whether there are alternatives that can accommodate [the claimed]
right 'at de minimis costs to valid penological interests.161 The majority noted that one clear alternative is a case-by-case determination of
whether specific material would adversely affect the rehabilitation of
specific prisoners. 162 The court contended that this option would obviously entail significant costs and would open up official decision
making to charges of vagueness. 163 The majority then suggested that
the alternative to this case-by-case method is a flexible standard by
which prison officials could prevent certain materials from entering
the prison for a specific group of prisoners, though this approach
might give rise to overbreadth challenges. 164 However, the court
noted that these potential problems could not arise until such a plan
was actually implemented. 165 Hence, the final Turner factor was
166
satisfied.

157

See id. at 201-02.
I& at 201.

158

See id. The court also noted that "[e]ven if there were such a bizarre entitlement,

156

the regulations would still satisfy this factor, as they leave the inmate free to enjoy all written forms of smut not barred by the regulations upheld in Thornburgh." Id at 201 n.7.
159 See id. at 201.
160 See id
161 Id (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987)). The court stressed that the
Turner Court distinguished this test from a "least restrictive alternative" one. Id (internal
quotation marks omitted).
162
163
164
165

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
i&
id.at 202.

166

See id. at 201-02.
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The majority thereby concluded that the regulation passed each
prong of the Turner test for reasonableness. 167 The court reiterated
that this reasonableness test only requires the court to determine if
Congress could have reasonably believed that prohibiting these pornographic pictures from prisons would further its goal of prisoner rehabilitation. 168 The court then briefly dismissed the plaintiff's two
169
other theories and lifted the district court's permanent injunction.
In this manner, the court effectively left the Ensign Amendment and
its implementing regulations intact.
B.

Mauro v. Arpaio

In contrast to the outcome in Amate4 the Ninth Circuit approached the same issue using the same test but reached the opposite
conclusion in Mauro v. Arpaio.170 The case was decided in July 1998,
but on December 2, 1998, the Ninth Circuit withdrew this opinion
pending a rehearing en banc.17 1 In an opinion issued following that
hearing, the en banc court affirmed the district court's decision to
uphold the regulation, thus overturning the earlier Mauro I opinion. 172 By so ruling, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in AmateL173 However, despite the reversal of
what this Note argues is the more constitutionally sound decision, the
analysis of this Note remains unchanged. First, the outcome of Mauro
I!illustrates yet again the propensity of the judiciary to curtail the First
Amendment rights of prisoners. At this time, both of the circuit
courts that have addressed the issue have applied an exceptionally deferential standard that results in an unconstitutional impingement of
rights. Moreover, although both courts followed a similar line of reasoning, their harsh conclusion and the vacillation apparent in the
Maurosaga demand that this issue be revisited. Finally, the opinion of
See id. at 202.
See id, at 203.
169 See id. The two additional theories alleged were "excessive vagueness and a claim
that the regulations' distinction between pictorial and verbal works [wa]s content-based."
Id. The court responded to these complaints by characterizing the distinction as one based
on form, not content, and added that "in any event we have seen that Safley's neutrality
requirement both displaces conventional First Amendment strictures on content-based
limits and is satisfied by these regulations." Id. The majority noted that the vagueness
claim might have merit, but remanded the issue because the district court had not addressed it. See id.
170 147 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.) [hereinafter Mauro1], reh'ggranted,162 F.3d 547 (9th Cir.
1998), rev'd en ban, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1419 (2000).
171 The order reads as follows: "Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused regular
active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court
pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-5. The three-judge panel opinion, Mauro v. Arpaio, ... is
withdrawn." Mauro v. Arpaio, 162 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
172 See Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Mauro fl].
173 See supra Part III.A.
167

168
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the Ninth Circuit panel that originally heard the case carries jurisprudential weight in its own right, and at the very least, that panel's reasoning is instructive.
The court's reasoning in Mauro H1 closely parallels that of the
court in AmateL Mauro I initially came before the appellate court
when Jonathan Mauro appealed the dismissal of his § 1983174
claim. 75 The district court had determined "that the Maricopa
County prison system's policy prohibiting inmates from possessing
'sexually explicit' materials does not violate the First Amendment." 176
Mauro brought suit after the prison in which he was detained denied
his request to receive a subscription to Playboy magazine.' 77 The policy, which the County adopted in 1993, defined sexually explicit
materials as "personal photographs, drawings, and magazines and
pictorials that show frontal nudity." 7 8 Under this policy, a mail officer-a rotating position among the prison staff-determines
whether incoming mail contains the proscribed material. 1 79 Consequently, consistent and uniform enforcement of the policy is not
guaranteed.
The County expressed three reasons for its policy: "safety, rehabilitation of inmates, and reduction of sexual harassment of female
prison personnel." 8 0 The district court granted the County's motion
for summary judgment, "holding that the policy, though broad, was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 18 The Ninth
182
Circuit then reviewed this grant of summary judgment de novo.
In the appellate court, Mauro claimed that the County's regulation was unconstitutional, both as it related to Playboy specifically, and
as it related to material showing frontal nudity generally. 8 3 In defense of its regulation, the County asserted that "(i) its policy does not
concern materials protected by the First Amendment; (ii) Mauro cannot bring a facial challenge to the regulation, and (iii) even if Mauro
could bring a facial challenge, the regulation is constitutional as applied to Playboy and as applied to any material depicting frontal
84
nudity."'
174

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997).

175

Because the facts in both Mauro I and Mauro II remain the same, this Note relies

on the more detailed factual discussion presented in MauroI,147 F.3d at 1138-39.
176
177
178

Id. at 1138.

See id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

179

See id.

180

Id.

181
182
183

1d& at 1139.
See id.
See id.

184

Id.
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In the en banc rehearing after Mauro Iwas withdrawn, the Ninth
Circuit began its analysis by explaining the two central tenets of prison
law that formed the basis and backdrop of its opinion.' 8 5 The first of
these principles "is that prisoners are not stripped of the protections
of the Constitution upon incarceration." Thus, "when a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect [prisoners']
constitutional rights."' 86 The second principle framing the court's
analysis was the notion that "courts are ill equipped to deal with the
87
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.'
The court then explicitly stated that it was compelled to "apply a deferential standard of review,"' 8 8 requiring only a reasonable relationship between regulation and penological interest. 189
The court proceeded to apply the four-factor test from Turner v.
Safley.190 The court argued that the first factor-a rational connection
between the regulation and the government interest-was satisfied. 191
They asserted that the goals of rehabilitation, reduction of sexual harassment of female guards, and maintenance ofjail security were legitimate and neutral, and that the policy under attack was rationally
related to these objectives. 192 The court acknowledged, however, that
the "'fit' between the policy and the jail's objectives was not 'exact,'
' 93
but maintained that "an exact fit is not required.'
Next, the court addressed the second Turner factor and concluded that this factor was met.'9 4 The court explained that "a sensible and expansive view of the constitutional right infringed by the
jail's policy is the 'right to receive sexually explicit communications"'
and concluded that "there are many alternative means available to the
inmates. 11 95 Analyzing the third factor-impact on third parties-the
court decided that "[t] he impact of such unrestricted access [to sexually explicit materials] would be significant.' 9 6 Citing the risks of in185
186

See Mauro 1.,
188 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

187

Md,

Md (internal quotation marks omitted).
189 See id. The court noted that the separation of powers doctrine dictates deference
to prison authorities in matters of prison administration. See id For an interesting discussion of the theory of separation of powers, see David C.Mayer, Note, Reviewing National
Security ClearanceDecisions: The ClashBetween Title VII and Bivens Claims, 85 CoRNEuL L.REV.
786 (2000).
190 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
191 See Mauro 1, 188 F.3d at 1059-60.
188

192
193
194

See id.
Id at 1060.
See id. at 1061.

195 IdM("[The regulation] does not ban sexually explicit letters between inmates and
others, nor does it ban sexually explicit articles or photographs of clothed females.").
196

Id,
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creased tension between inmates and additional harassment of female
employees, the court decided that accommodation of the prisoners'
asserted right would jeopardize the safety of others. 197 Thus, the
court declared that deference to prison authority was warranted. 198
Finally, the court tumed to the last Turner factor-whether the challenged regulation is "an exaggerated response to the jail's concerns."1 99 The majority noted that "[t]he burden is on the prisoner
challenging the regulation, not on the prison officials, to show that
there are obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation." 20 0 Moreover,
the court asserted that "if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost
to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence
that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard."'20 1 The court determined that Mauro's suggested alternatives
would impose too great a cost on the prison's interests and were thus
invalid; the policy was therefore not deemed an exaggerated
20 2
response.
Thus, the court in Mauro II concluded that the regulation was
reasonably related to the asserted penological interests and therefore
no First Amendment violation occurred.
IV
A MORE PROTECTIVE VIEw OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
This Note asserts that sexually explicit material should be permitted in prisons. This conclusion is supported by two main arguments.
First, this Note argues that the judiciary should return to the test articulated in Procunierv. Martinez and accordingly evaluate prison regulations under an intermediate scrutiny test. 20 3

Application of an

intermediate scrutiny test would make it more difficult for government officials to restrict pornographic material within jails. Second,
this Note submits that a proper application of the Turner reasonableness standard 20 4 might also result in the invalidation of regulations
broadly restricting prisoners' access to sexually explicit materials. 20 5
197

See id. at 1061-62.

198

See id.at 1062.

199
200

Id.

201

I&
IRt (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)).

202
203

See id at 1063.
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled in part by Thornburgh v.

Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (examining
the Martinez test).
204 See supra notes 81-85.
205 See infra Part LV.B.
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Reversion to Intermediate Scrutiny

Over the last thirty years, courts have become increasingly deferential to prison authorities when reviewing restrictions on prisoners'
rights. 206 The gravity of this development, combined with the importance of First Amendment rights generally, warrants stricter judicial
scrutiny of prison regulations that burden these rights. Judicial endorsement of intermediate scrutiny could stop this dangerous progression toward complete abrogation of prisoners' First Amendment
rights.
Prisoners are in a unique and vulnerable position in American
society: although deserving of punishment when guilty, once incarcerated they find themselves at the whim and mercy of the government
and prison officials. As ChiefJudge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit explained:
[IT]he special place of prisoners in our society makes them more
dependent on judicial protection than perhaps any other group.
Few minorities are so "discrete and insular," so little able to defend
their interests through participation in the political process, so vulnerable to oppression by an unsympathetic majority. Federal courts
have a special responsibility to ensure that the members of such de2 7
fenseless groups are not deprived of their constitutional rights.

Thus, courts should protect prisoners from unfair infringement of
2
their rights.

08

Categorical censorship of publications compromises inmates'
First Amendment rights to free speech and expression, 20 9 rights which
the Supreme Court usually protects vigorously. 210 Although prisoners
do lose some rights upon incarceration,2 1 ' "[p]rison walls do not form
206

See supra Part II.
Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 960 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (separate
statement of Edwards, J.).
208
See, e.g., Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 3, at 1020 (asserting that "the justifications
that have been advanced for free speech guarantees... should apply with equal, if not
greater force, to persons in prisons. Prisoners do not value freedom of speech any less
than free citizens, nor is the right of any less use to them than to nonincarcerated
people").
209
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
210
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (HolmesJ, dissenting)
("[Tihe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ....
"); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Speech on Mattersof Public Concern: The Perilsof anEmergingFirstAmendment Category,
59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1990) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has declared that
'speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment" (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
211
For example, prisoners forfeit "the right to associate, deemed inconsistent with the
purposes of the correctional system." Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Note, Constitutionalityof Regulations RestrictingPrisoner Correspondence With the Media 56 FoRDHAm
L. Rv. 1151, 1159
(1988). This limitation is illustrated by the fact that "prison officials may properly restrict a
prisoner's right of association and right to communicate by refusing to allow the prisoner
to leave the institution temporarily to exercise these rights." Id.at 1159 n.81.
207
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a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution."21 2 Accordingly, among other rights, prisoners retain First
Amendment liberties.2 1 3 Hence, the importance of freedom of
speech transcends the barrier of the prison gate. Moreover, although
sexually explicit material may be at the fringe of what society and the
Supreme Court consider protected speech, pornography such as the
material at issue in the above prisoners' rights cases is not necessarily
obscene and consequently remains protected by the First
2 14
Amendment.
212 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545
(1979) (explaining that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison").
213 See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) ("Inmates clearly retain
protections afforded by the First Amendment.... ."); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 422-23 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (asserting that inmates retain all First
Amendment rights "except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from [them]
by law" (quoting Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944)), overruled in part by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
214 Obscene material has traditionally been excluded from the categories of speech
protected by the First Amendment. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 64, § 16.56, at
1194-95. The first case to "convert[ ] [the Supreme Court's] traditional assumption into a
rule of law," id.
at 1196, was Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Court
asserted that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." Id. at 485. The Roth standard for identifying obscene material is that it "(a) appeals
to a prurient interest in sex, (b) has no redeeming literary, artistic, political, or scientific
merit, and (c) is on the whole offensive to the average person under contemporary community standards." NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 64, § 16.57, at 1197. The next time the
Court articulated a clear obscenity standard was Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973),
where the Court explained that the three-part test is
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
MLat 24 (citations omitted).
The Miller test is currently the controlling test for obscenity. Pornography and other
"adult entertainment," however, do not fall within the ambit of the aforementioned definition of obscenity. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) ("In evaluating the free
speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that '[s]exual expression which is
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.'" (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989))); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745 (1978) ("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) ("At least
where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected
speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression."); NowAx & ROTUNDA,
supra note 64, § 16.61(k), at 1215 (explaining that although "[t]he state can criminalize
anything that is constitutionally 'obscene,'" courts should not classify pornography as
speech that is constitutionally obscene); cf Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
498 (1985) (stating that a work that elicits "only normal, healthy sexual desires" should not
be considered obscene); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (adjusting the
Millerstandard when dealing with child pornography, but noting that "the distribution of
descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene... retains First
Amendment protection"). Therefore, non-obscene pornography and sexually explicit ma-
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Applying a reasonableness test like the Turner standard makes it
inordinately easy for states or the federal government to pass any regulation restricting prisoners' rights, provided they can assert some "legitimate penological interest[ ].,,21 This approach is problematic
because it may result in an unconstitutional infringement of rights
under the guise of a correctly applied test. The Court in Thornburgh v.
Abbott, however, argued to the contrary.2 1 6 The Abbott majority
claimed that the Turner reasonableness standard it adopted "is not
toothless."2 17 However, application of this standard in practice belies
this assertion, because the Turner test is virtually never used to strike
down a regulation that restricts prisoners' rights. 2 1 8 In his partial dis-

sent in Thornburgh v. Abbott, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's characterization of the standard as one with teeth. He explained
that
if the standard can be satisfied by nothing more than a "logical connection" between the regulation and any legitimate penological
concern perceived by a cautious warden, it is virtually meaningless.
Application of the standard would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern and a deferential trial

terial that is at issue in prisoners' rights cases retains its status as government-protected
speech. One notable exception to the "pornography is protected" idea is child pomography, which loses its classification as protected speech and is subject to stricter government
regulation. See Ferber,458 U.S. at 756-764 (stating that child pornography is "without the
protection of the First Amendment" and explaining why "states are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children").
215
Turner,482 U.S. at 89. As Justice Stevens explained in his partial dissent from Turner, "[t]he Court's ... open-ended 'reasonableness' standard makes it much too easy to
uphold restrictions on prisoners' First Amendment rights on the basis of administrative
concerns and speculation about possible security risks rather than on the basis of evidence
that the restrictions are needed to further an important governmental interest." Id. at 101
n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216
See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989) (adopting the reasonableness
test and rejecting heightened scrutiny in prison mail cases).
217 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
218 This assertion remains true despite the fact that one of the regulations at issue in
Turner itself was overturned. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 (finding that the restriction on
inmate marriages did not meet the reasonableness standard because it was an exaggerated
response to administrative concerns); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227
(1990) (using Turner's reasonableness test to uphold a regulation authorizing treatment of
prisoners with antipsychotic drugs without their consent). The only cases that have questioned the Turner standard have done so in the context of freedom of religion; these cases
merely note how the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 partially superseded Turnerby defining a statutory right to the free exercise of religion. See, e.g., Fawaad v.Jones, 81
F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 1996); Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. McCotter, 515 U.S. 1166 (1995), implied overruling recognized
by Sinnett v. Simmons, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Kan. 1999); Levinson-Roth v. Parries,
872 F. Supp. 1439, 1451 (D. Md. 1995).
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court is able to discern a logical connection between that concern
219
and the challenged regulation.
Thus, plausible arguments suggest that the standard is much less effective than the Justices in Abbott were willing to admit. 220 In the name
of deference to prison authority, the Court appears to be "in a headlong rush to strip inmates of all but a vestige of free communication
22
with the world beyond the prison gate." '
The Court should therefore return to a heightened scrutiny analysis for prison regulations to ensure that prisoners' rights are evaluated fairly. One goal of the Constitution is "to provide a bulwark
against infringements that might otherwise be justified as necessary
expedients of governing."2 22 Although the Court "must give due consideration to the needs of those in power [here, prison administrators], th[e] Court's role is to ensure that fundamental restraints on
that power are enforced." 223 As Justice Brennan posited in his dissent
in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, "adoption of 'reasonableness' as a standard of review for all constitutional challenges by inmates is inade2 24
quate to this task."
Additionally, characterization of the rights implicated in each case
supports the use of Martinez's intermediate scrutiny, not Turners reasonableness test, for analyzing regulations forbidding sexually explicit
material in prisons. The mail censorship regulations in Martinez involved the First Amendment rights of both prisoners and free citizens,
a fact that the majority relied upon to support its conclusion. 2 25 In
contrast, the regulations challenged in Turner only compromised the
rights of inmates. 22 6 The cases that challenge prohibitions on sexually
explicit material implicate the rights of inmates who desire those publications and the rights of the publishers who wish to communicate
with subscribing prisoners by sending their materials to the inmates. 227 Thus, one can argue that cases such as Mauroand Amatel are
219
Abbott, 490 U.S. at 434 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 100-01 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). Stevens added that he could envision "a logical connection between prison discipline and the use of bullwhips on prisoners; and security is logically furthered by a total

ban on inmate communication, not only with other inmates but also with outsiders who...
might be interested in arranging an attack within the prison... or an escape." IR,
220 See Leading Cases, supra note 65, at 247 ("Abbott's validation of censorship policies
that needlessly infringe upon the media's right to disseminate information demonstrates
that, contrary to the majority's assertion, the reasonableness standard is 'toothless.'").
221 Abbot4 490 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

224
225
226
227

Id.(Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.

Cf. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989) ("[T]here is no question that
publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek
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more analogous to Martinez.22 8 Therefore, the stricter Martinez standard should apply when courts evaluate the constitutionality of prison
regulations restricting access to sexually explicit materials.
Justice Stevens suggested this point in his partial dissent in Abbott.2 29 He explained that in Martinez, the Court "[f]ocus[ed] not on
the rights of prisoners, but on the 'inextricably meshed' rights of nonprisoners 'who have a particularized interest in communicating with
them.'" 230 Justice Stevens added "that an 'undemanding standard of
review' could not be squared with the fact 'that the First Amendment
liberties of free citizens are implicated in censorship of prisoner
mail."' 231 Justice Stevens also asserted that contrary to what some Justices believed, Martinezis in fact still good law.23 2 Thus,Justice Stevens
argued that the Abbott majority needlessly overruled part of Martinez in
2 33
addition to applying the wrong standard to the case at bar.

Under a Martinez-like "least restrictive means" standard requiring

a regulation to further a substantial governmental interest, 23 4 courts
their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners.");
LeadingCases, supranote 65, at 246-47 (explaining that "[bly excessively restricting publishers' ability to disseminate messages, Abbott offends the constitutional rights of both publishers and inmates, as well as the principles underlying the first amendment," and asserting
that "[b]y according prison officials broad authority to limit publishers' access to inmates,
the Abbott Court unduly abridges the media's right to disseminate information").
228
Cf Levine, supra note 66, at 910 (discussing how, in considering the restrictions on
publications in Abbott, the "Court's comparison of the regulations in Turner to those in
Abbott is tenuous at best").
229
See Abbott, 490 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(examining with approval the requirements of Martinez).
230
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232
See id. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Stevens
asserted that Turner "confirmed the vitality of Martinez for evaluating encroachments on
the First Amendment rights of nonprisoners." Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He added that Turner"cited and quoted from Martinez more than
20 times; not once did it disapprove Martinez's holding, its standard, or its recognition of a
special interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of those who are not prisoners."
Id at 427 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other commentators
have echoed this sentiment, noting that
the Court in Turnerimplicitly affirmed Martinez in both parts of its opinion.
First, it declared Martinez inapplicable to a regulation restricting inmate-toinmate correspondence because Martinez turned on the consequential restriction of an outsider's first amendment interest in uncensored correspondence with an inmate. Thus, the Court acknowledged Martinez's role
in cases involving outsiders' rights. Furthermore, it explicitly recognized
that the Martinez standard might apply to a regulation restricting inmate
marriages because of the restriction's impact on nonprisoners. Thus, nowhere in Turnerand its progenitors did the Court undermine Martinez. To
the contrary, Turner implicitly affirmed both the Martinez standard of scrutiny and its greater protection of noninmate rights.
Leading Cases, supra note 65, at 246 (footnotes omitted).
233
See Abbott, 490 U.S. at 427-31 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234
SeeProcunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled in part byThomburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
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would likely strike down regulations seeking to generally prohibit prisoner access to sexually explicit material. Although rehabilitation, order, and security are substantial interests as defined in Martinez,235
prison administrators would be hard-pressed to illustrate how banning
sexually explicit material from inmates would actually further any of
those interests. Intermediate scrutiny requires a more solid link between the prison regulation and governmental interest than does a
Turner reasonableness standard. 236 Therefore, prison officials or the
legislature would have to do more than simply assert that such a link
2 37
exists-they would need to offer proof

The proffered justifications for the regulations in Amatel v.
Reno23 8 illustrate the difficulty in establishing a causal link between
pornography and rehabilitation. Although the D.C. Circuit upheld
the restriction, the dissent pointed out that the court did so with little
or no proof on the record.2 39 Not only did the record itself fail to
establish a link, one can argue that no connection exists at all.24o

Judge Wald argued that "[a]t best, it can be said that a few studies
235
236

See id.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Additionally, a tenuous link between
government interest and regulation was problematic in Martinez, where "the Court was not
persuaded that some of the regulations actually furthered the interests invoked by the
prison officials in their defense." BRAiNH
& KRANrz, supra note 13, at 138. This reluctance illustrated that "there were limits to the deference that the Court would accord the
judgments of prison officials about what was needed to protect institutional security or to
further other important correctional goals." Id. at 138-39.
237 See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413-14. However, the Court noted that "[this does not
mean... prison administrators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would [occur]." Id. at 414. Incidentally, lack of proof may even doom a statute

under Turners reasonableness test. In her Amatel dissent, Judge Wald noted that "[t]he
Court's rejection of the marriage restriction at issue in [Turner] clearly turned on the quality of the evidence before the Court...." Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Wald, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2392 (1999). This outcome "suggests
that while a reasonable relationship might possibly have been demonstrated between the
marriage restriction and the interests asserted, the prison had failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that relationship." Id. at 208 (Wald, J., dissenting).
238
See Amate4 156 F.3d at 196-97.
239
See id. at 208-09 (Wald, J., dissenting).
240
See id. (Wald, J., dissenting). There is conflicting scientific evidence regarding a
link between pornography and crime, which is the result rehabilitation seeks to avoid. See
id. (Wald, J., dissenting). The majority held that the proper inquiry is "not whether the
regulation in fact advances the government interest, only whether the legislature might
reasonably have thought that it would." Id. at 199. Thus, under the majority's view, this
inconclusive or conflicting scientific evidence is sufficient. See id. at 199-201. In contrast,
Judge Wald's dissent posits that the relationship between rehabilitation and pornography
must be established on the record. See id. at 207 (Wald, J., dissenting). The dissent concludes that the government did not offer any evidence in that case and cited to scientific
literature supporting the opposite view-that no established relationship between pornography and crime exists. See id. at 208-09 (Wald, J., dissenting); see also George C. Thomas
III, A Critiqueof the Anti-PornographySyllogism, 52 MD. L. REv. 122, 124 (1993) (asserting that
there is "no available scientific evidence [that] establishes a causal relationship between
pornography and rape").
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have shown a causative relationship between violent pornography and
short-term increases in aggression," 24 1 and that "[i]n all other respects, the relationship between pornography and criminal activity is
merely correlative. '24 2 Under Turner's reasonableness test, such inconclusive evidence may be sufficient because "[f] or judges seeking
only a reasonable connection between legislative goals and actions,
scientific indeterminacy is determinative." 243 However, such an attenuated connection should not be sufficient under intermediate
scrutiny.
Additionally, many of the statutes that ban sexually explicit materials in prisons define their terms broadly.244 As Martinez explains, "the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved." 245 Therefore, even a regulation that furthers a substantial interest will be struck down if "its sweep is unnecessarily
broad."246 Regulations that ban pornography in jails are commonly
attacked under the overbreadth doctrine. 24 7 Overbroad statutes are
"designed to burden or punish activities that are not constitutionally
protected, but [their] flaw is that, as drafted, they also include[ ] activities protected by the First Amendment." 248 Hence, legislatures must
draft their statutes carefully in order to avoid possible constitutional
2 49
invalidation under the overbreadth doctrine.
One approach that would avoid overbreadth problems, permit
prisoners to receive sexually explicit publications, and protect the gov241
242

Amatel, 156 F.3d at 208 (Wald, J., dissenting).
Id. at 208-09 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald also argued that this correlative

relationship is not sufficient to establish even the rational connection required in Turner.
See id. at 209 n.6 (Wald. J., dissenting).
243
244

Id at 201.
See, e.g., supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.

245
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled in part by Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
246
Id. at 414.

247

For examples of overbreadth arguments, see infra note 248.

NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 64, § 16.8, at 996. One example of an overbroad
statute is the statute in AmateL- as written, the statute would not only ban pornography, but
might prevent prisoners from accessing material such as "Michelangelo's David, for example, or grim photographs of naked bodies piled in the pits of Germany's concentration
camps." Amate 156 F.3d at 210 (Wald, J., dissenting); see also Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d
1137, 1140 (9th Cir.) (explaining that the challenged regulation would prevent inmates
from receiving "any photograph, drawing or graphic that depicted frontal nudity," and
that this category "would include such magazines as National Geographic, medical journals,
artistic works, and countless other materials"), reh'g granted, 162 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1998),
rev'd en banc, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1419 (2000).
249
For example, overbreadth was one of the issues that initially doomed a NewJersey
statute forbidding sexually explicit material from the state's Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center. See Waterman v. Verniero, 12 F. Supp. 2d 378, 380-81 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding
the NewJersey statute unconstitutionally overbroad and granting permanent injunction),
rev'd sub nom. Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1999).
248
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ernmental interests of rehabilitation and security is for prison officials
to perform a case-by-case determination of which prisoners could receive certain publications. 2 50 This system would allow officials to prevent psychologically unfit prisoners from handling pornographic
materials, while ensuring that obscene publications remain out of
prison circulation. In contrast to a blanket ban on pornography, a
case-by-case determination is more limited in scope and application
and does not prohibit protected material. Because a complete ban
would still require officials to inspect publications, a case-by-case approach would be no more burdensome on prison resources and administrators than an overly broad scheme. Additionally, psychological
examinations are already routinely performed on inmates, 25' and
could also be used to determine a prisoner's candidacy to receive sexually explicit materials, thereby conserving resources. In fact, many
prisons in this country have successfully implemented plans that utilize these individualized determinations. 252 Additionally, the case-bycase nature of the determinations in Abbott was one of the factors that
See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
Some states require or provide for psychological examination of convicts upon incarceration. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5068 (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 6523(a) (1999) (providing for a diagnostic service within the Department of Corrections
to make social, medical, psychological, and other studies regarding persons convicted and
sentenced to prison); Hines v. Anderson, 439 F. Supp. 12, 17 (D. Minn. 1977) (mandating
that all inmates entering state prisons receive physical and psychological evaluations).
252 See Thompson v. Patteson, 985 F.2d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the Texas
Department of Corrections rule "which allows denial of publications for which 'a specific
factual determination has been made that the publication is detrimental to prisoner's rehabilitation because it would encourage deviate criminal sexual behavior,'" though materials "shall not be excluded solely because they have sexual content"); see also Dawson v.
Scurr, 986 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1993) (examining Iowa's regulatory scheme for prisoners'
access to sexually explicit material). For example, Iowa has implemented statutes that classify pornographic material, regulate each category differently, and evaluate prisoners to
determine their psychological fitness. The Iowa Administrative Code Rules 291-20.6(4) to
(6) control these areas:
Rule 20.6(4) provided that prison officials could exclude publications
which portrayed, interalia, child sex acts, sadomasochism or bestiality. Rule
20.6(5) provided that inmates found psychologically unfit could be denied
access to sexually explicit materials. Finally, Rule 20.6(6) limited inmate
access to publications portraying "fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, ejaculation, sexual intercourse or male erection" to a "designated controlled
area" (the reading room).
Id- at 259 (quoting IowA ADMIN. CODE r. 291-20.6(4) to (6) (1981). The determination
under Rule 20.6(5) involved an inquiry into whether the material "is detrimental to the
rehabilitation of an individual inmate, based on psychological/psychiatric recommendation." IM.at 259 n.4. The rule as applied involves a process where
publication review committee members screened publications ordered by
inmates and decided whether to allow, control or deny a publication. Publications which were allowed were permitted in inmates' cells; these publications might contain sexually explicit material, but not depictions
described in Rule 20.6(6). Publications which were controlled were those
which contained depictions described in Rule 20.6(6); these could be
viewed only in the reading room. Finally, publications which were denied
250
251
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led the Court to uphold the regulations under a reasonableness
25 3
standard.
In conclusion, an intermediate scrutiny standard would allow
prison inmates to access sexually explicit materials that are protected
by the First Amendment. This approach would not foreclose the possibility of case-by-case regulation of prisoner access to sexually explicit
materials. However, under an intermediate scrutiny test, as well as an
overbreadth challenge, courts would likely find a blanket ban
unconstitutional.
B.

Application of Turner

As the foregoing discussion asserts, reverting to an intermediate
scrutiny standard would help ensure that legislatures do not infringe
on prisoners' rights. Nonetheless, even if courts refuse to apply intermediate scrutiny to regulations prohibiting sexually explicit materials
in prisons, courts might still strike down unreasonable restrictions on
prisoners' First Amendment rights by applying the Turner reasonableness test more carefully.
The Turnertest requires a regulation to be "reasonably related" to
"legitimate penological interests"

25 4

in order to survive constitutional

scrutiny. This standard is significantly more deferential to prison authorities than is an intermediate scrutiny test, and consequently leaves
many more restrictions intact. However, this Note submits that the
most equitable way to employ the Turner reasonableness test would be
to adhere to the approach in Mauro 1255 utilizing this test to strike
down legislation that infringes on prisoners' rights. 256 By using this
approach, courts can overcome the impotence commonly displayed in
(those containing child sex acts or bestiality, for example) were banned
altogether.
Id. at 259. Thus, the Iowa regulations allowed for individualized determinations that would
not prevent al prisoners from accessing sexually explicit material, and would actually allow
prisoners to view some forms of arguably obscene pornography. See id. Inmates at the
Iowa State Penitentiary challenged these regulations, claiming that the restriction of certain materials to the designated reading room was unconstitutional. See id. at 260. The
Eighth Circuit, however, upheld the challenged regulation under the Turner reasonableness standard. See id. at 262-63. Hence, Dawson illustrates three key points: (1) prisons do
allow pornography in many cases, (2) a case-by-case approach can work, and perhaps most
importantly, (3) courts can use Turner to actually uphold a statute permittingpornography

in prisons.
253 See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1989) ("[We are comforted by
the individualized nature of the determinations required by the regulation.").
254 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
255
147 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.), rehggranted,162 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1998), revd en banG
188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1419 (2000).
256 See id. at 1144-45.
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applications of the Turner standard and supply the teeth for this test
257
promised by the Court in Thornburgh v. Abbott.

1. Mauro I
Although Mauro I was vacated and reversed en banc, 25 8 the

court's reasoning in that case demonstrates the preferable application
of the Turnertest. As mentioned above, Mauro initially brought suit to
challenge a regulation banning sexually explicit material in the Maricopa Countyjails.2 59 Following the district court's decision to uphold
the ban, Mauro appealed to the Ninth Circuit.2

60

After the court de-

termined that Mauro had standing to challenge the ban as facially
overbroad, 261 it addressed the constitutionality of the statute. 262 The
2 63 for the proposition that
court relied on Procunier v. Martinez
"[p]risoners do not lose their constitutional rights merely because
they are incarcerated, although such freedoms are limited necessarily
by the context of their surroundings." 26 4 The court then launched
into an analysis following the Turner framework. 265
The first Turner factor requires that the government "establish
that its justifications are legitimate and neutral and that there is a rational connection between the regulation and the justifications for
that regulation." 26 6 The court found that the government's three asserted interests-safety, rehabilitation of inmates, and reduction of
sexual harassment-were legitimate. 26 7 Next, the court relayed the
definition of "neutrality" as it applies to prison regulations:
[t]he regulation or practice must further an important or substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Where...
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

490 U.S. at 414.
See Mauro H, 188 F.3d at 1058, 1063.
See Mauro I, 147 F.3d at 1138.
See id. at 1139.
See id. at 1140.
See id. at 1140-45.
416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled in part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989);

see also supra Part IIA (examining Martinez in detail).
264

Mauro I, 147 F.3d at 1140.

265 See id. at 1141-44; see also supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (examining the
Turnerfactors). The Ninth Circuit explained the holding in Turner, noting.
that there are four factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness
of a regulation: (i)
whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between
the regulation and the government interest put forth as justification and
whether the purported interest is neutral; (ii) the extent to which alternative means of expression remain open to prisoners; (iii) what impact accommodation of the inmates' rights would have on guards, other inmates,
and allocation of prison resources; and, (iv) the absence or presence of
ready alternatives.
Mauro I, 147 F.3d at 1140-41 (paraphrasing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)).
266 Mauro I, 147 F.3d at 1141.
267

See id.
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prison administrators draw distinctions between publications solely
on the basis of their potential implications for prison security, the
regulations are 'neutral' in the technical sense in which we meant
268
and used that term in Turner.

Using this definition, the court determined that the challenged regulation was indeed neutral, because it "purports to distinguish among
incoming mail and publications based upon the materials' potential
effect on prison safety, not based upon a certain message contained
2 69
within that material."
Next, the Ninth Circuit inquired whether a rational connection
existed between the challenged regulation and the county's goal. 2 70
As the court explained, "[i]n demonstrating that a regulation is rationally related to a legitimate goal, prison officials need not prove
that the banned material actually caused problems in the past, or that
the materials are 'likely' to cause problems in the future so long as
27
there is an 'intolerable risk' of violence." '
The court proceeded to examine the County's evidence that
prior harassment of female guards implicated sexually explicit materials. 272 The court determined that these incidents had not involved
any materials other than "magazines such as Playboy' and that the only
evidence presented that suggested "future danger" was an official's
opinion.2 73 The County offered neither expert testimony nor a thorough explanation to support its argument 2 74 and only attempted to
justify its policy with speculation.2 75 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit determined that Maricopa County had "imposed a prohibition that went
far beyond any sanctioned by this court, or any other."27 6 Thus the
court held that the County had failed to demonstrate that its regula2 77
tion was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
The court next turned to the second factor of the Turner analysis:
"whether a regulation leaves open alternative means of expressing the
right upon which the regulation impinges." 278 In applying this rule,

269
270
271

Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting Abbott, 490 U.S. at 415-16).
Id. at 1142.
See id. at 1142-43.
Id. at 1142 (quoting Abbott, 490 U.S. at 417).

272

See id. at 1142-43.

273

Id. at 1142.

268

274 See id. at 1143.
275 See i& The county asserted that "the possibility that 'inmates will misbehave when
using materials depicting frontal nudity is clearly a reasonable possibility to which deference toward the policies ofjail officials is required.'" &
276
1d
277 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
278 Id. The court cited Thornburgh v. Abbott 490 U.S. 401 (1989), as its guide for the
application of the alternative means analysis. See MauroI, 147 F.3d at 1143. In Abbott; the
Supreme Court noted somewhat ambiguously that if a regulation is very broad, it has a
greater chance of contravening the alternative means test. See Abbot4 490 U.S. at 417 n.15.
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the court in Mauro I held that "[t] he blanket prohibition unnecessarily precludes prisoners' access to materials fully protected by the First
Amendment." 279 The Ninth Circuit found the regulation overbroad
because it would ban sweeping "categories of materials without indi28 0
vidualized consideration."
Finally, the court addressed the third and fourth Turner factors.2 8 ' The third factor is akin to a balancing test which weighs the

accommodation of the prisoner's right against the effect of accommodation on both prison guards and inmates. 28 2 Beyond the general
claim that access to materials involving nudity would have an adverse
2 83
effect upon prison security, the County did not address this factor.
Thus, the court rejected the County's argument and decided that it
need not address this prong of the Turner test because the regulation
failed under the other Turner criteria. 28 4 The court then determined
that it had neither the "ability nor [the] need" to address the fourth
prong of the Turner test.2 8 5 Because Mauro did not make any allega-

tions that implicated this factor, the court found it unnecessary to rule
28 6
on this criterion.
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit determined that the County's
prohibition was overbroad and that no "limiting construction" was
possible. 28 7 The court consequently struck the entire regulation because it "impinge[d] upon the right of inmates to receive material
protected by the First Amendment... [and was] overbroad... and as
such [wa]s unconstitutional." 28 8 As this holding illustrates, the Turner
test can in fact be used to strike legislation that curtails prisoners' First
Amendment rights.
2.

Additional Considerations

Both Mauro I and Judge Wald's dissent in Amatel offer ways for a
court to overturn a pornography ban. One of the more vulnerable
links in the chain of Turnerrequirements is the necessity of a relationship between the regulation and the asserted interest.28 9 In Mauro I,
the court determined that no reasonable relationship existed because
279 Mauro I, 147 F.3d at 1144.
280 Id.
281
See id.
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See id
285 IR. This ignored fourth factor was "[t]he availability of 'obvious, easy' alternatives
that could be implemented at a 'de minim-u-s' [sic] cost", which "weigh[s] against the

reasonableness of a regulation." Id. (citation omitted).
286

See id,

287
288
289

Id at 1145.

I&
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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the regulation was so broad, and because the County failed to offer
any "proof or reasoned explanation" for its wide ban.2 90 In Amatel,
Judge Wald makes this same argument, claiming that a sparse record
is insufficient to justify a restriction on prisoners' First Amendment
rights, 29 1 especially where the asserted link is debatable. 292 Similarly,
Judge Wald's dissent also distinguishes between giving deference to
the legislature's judgment that its regulation is reasonable, and blindly
following the advice of the regulation's drafters with respect to both
29 3
the law's reasonableness and the reasonableness of its justification.
Even under a reasonableness test, courts should perform a more
searching review than that suggested by the Amatel majority in order
2 94
to avoid mindless acceptance of the legislature's reasoning.
The second Turnerfactor might also enable courts to strike down
bans on sexually explicit materials in prisons.2 95 This factor asks
whether alternative means of expressing the impinged-upon right are
available to prison inmates. 2 96 Generally, as discussed above, regulations banning sexually explicit material tend to be overbroad.2 97 The
Supreme Court has asserted that "the broader the regulation, the
more likely that the regulation will violate the alternative means
test. '298 Thus, many widely sweeping regulations risk being struck
Mauro I, 147 F.3d at 1143.
See Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Wald, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe determination of whether a regulation (or statute) is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest must depend, in all but the most obvious cases, on the evidentiary support for that nexus in the record before the court."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2392
(1999).
292
See id at 208-12 (Wald,J., dissenting); see also supranotes 237-42 and accompanying
text (discussing Judge Wald's disagreement with the Amatel majority on the issue of causal
linkage).
293 See Amate4 156 F.3d at 205-06 (Wald, J., dissenting). In Amate Congress, not the
Bureau of Prisons, was the law-making body to which deference was owed. See id. (Wald,J.,
dissenting); see also Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that
precedent in this area does not support blind judicial deference to the state's policy rationale); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 227 n.17 (7th Cir. 1986) (warning against complete deference to prison authority).
294 See Amate, 156 F.3d at 206 (Wald, J., dissenting).
295
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
296 See id.; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the second Turner
factor).
297 See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
298 Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 1998) (paraphrasing Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417 n.15 (1989)), reh'ggranted,162 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd en
ban, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1419 (2000). In Abbot, the Court
upheld the regulation because (1) the prisoners retained access to a variety of publications, and (2) the regulations did not impose unconstitutional shortcuts such as flatly excluding certain publications or having personnel other than the warden make individual
determinations. See Abbot4 490 U.S. at 417-18. In contrast, the regulation struck down in
Mauro I contained "no issue by issue determination of whether a particular depiction of
nudity might cause the unwanted consequences the prison seeks to avoid, nor does the
warden have a nondelegable duty to make such an individualized determination." Mauro I,
290
291
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down for violating the second Turnercriteria in addition to failing for
99
overbreadth.
Finally, scrutiny of the justification put forth by the government
to support its statute should enable courts to invalidate restrictions on
sexually explicit materials in prisons, even under more lenient standards such as Turner. One federal court noted that in order "[t] o establish that a legitimate penological interest supports a statute, a state
must provide evidence that the interest it proffered is the actual basis
for the statute." 30 0 Moreover, the true impetus for a regulation may
not be a desire to harm a particular group or animosity toward that
group. 301 Officials drafting prison regulations should keep in mind
that "[w]hatever sentiments [society] might hold regarding prisoners
for the crimes they have committed, these sentiments must not infect
our determination of the prisoners' constitutional rights." 30 2 Thus,
prison authorities cannot use a disingenuous penological interest to
support a regulation. If a court believes that hatred of criminals was
the true motivation behind a statute restricting prisoners' rights, it
30 3
must strike down that law.
In conclusion, courts may properly strike down a regulation banning pornography in prisons under the Turner reasonableness standard. However, because the likelihood of success under Turner is
small-as the insignificant number of successful claims and the low
147 F.3d at 1144. Additionally, the court noted that "[t]he County has not sought to ban a
small subset of materials containing obscene of [sic] otherwise objectionable nudity while
leaving open other means of viewing similar materials." IA
299 Despite the history of courts employing the Turnerstandard to uphold prison regulations, courts have used the standard to strike down a statute restricting prisoners' rights
and also to uphold a statute permitting pornography. For example, the marriage restriction in Turnerwas invalidated under the new standard articulated in that case. See Turner,
482 U.S. at 94-99; see also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Turner
Court's application of its standard to the facts of that case). Additionally, in Dawson v.
Scurr,986 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1993), the Eighth Circuit upheld a rule that allowed prisoners
to keep sexually explicit materials in their cells, but required that certain controlled explicit materials be viewed in a designated reading room. See id. at 259, 262-63; see also supra
note 252 (examining the Iowa scheme in greater detail).
300 Waterman v. Verniero, 12 F. Supp. 2d 364, 373 (D.NJ. 1998) (imposing preliminary injunction against enforcement of statute that barred sexually explicit materials in
prison), reu'd sub nom. Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1999).
301 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (invalidating a state amendment that
prohibited officials from protecting homosexuals from discrimination, in part because the
law "raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected"); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973) ("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.").
302 Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Wald, J., dissenting), cert. dnied, 119 S.Ct. 2392 (1999). DistrictJudge Alfred Wolin raised this same point in Waterman, noting that "NewJersey has failed to produce any evidence that rehabilitation, and
not outrage, motivated the enactment of" a New Jersey statute banning sexually explicit
material in a state prison for sexual offenders. Waterman, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 373.
303

See id.
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level ofjudicial scrutiny illustrate-the most efficacious way to protect
prisoners' rights is for courts to return to the Martinez intermediate
scrutiny standard.
CONCLUSION

The area of prisoners' rights has undergone sweeping changes
during the twentieth century. After the shift from the hands-off era to
a period ofjudicial activism, courts are currently returning to a deferential approach in analyzing restrictions on prisoners' freedoms. This
trend is especially apparent in the First Amendment context, in which
prison administrators, legislatures, and the judiciary are slowly tightening their control of prisoners' liberties.
Although the right to access sexually explicit material is objectionable to some people, the right nevertheless falls under the rubric
of the First Amendment.3 0 4 By preventing prisoners from exercising
this right, courts belie their "duty to uphold the Constitution, which
protects all citizens, including convicted felons." 30 5 Thus, in order to
protect inmates and preserve their First Amendment rights, courts
should revert to an intermediate scrutiny standard for evaluating prisoners' rights cases. If courts do not take such action to protect those
who are among the most vulnerable members of society, the implications are dangerous: "[h] istory teaches that when society stands idly by
as the state violates the rights of one segment of the body politic, the
30 6
rights of others will eventually be diminished."

305

See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
Waterman, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80.

306

I at 380.
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